In 2001 an individual (operationally transferable) quota system was introduced for all the most important industrial fisheries in Chile. This system was put in place after years of declining stocks and over investment.
Introduction
The fishing industry is one of the most important sectors of the Chilean economy. Yearly landings of fish averaged 5.4 million tons between 1993 and 2003 and exports of products directly related to the fishing industry, including fish meal and salmons from aquaculture, reached US$1.847 million in 2003, accounting for close to 10% of total exports that year.
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Until very recently the management of fisheries in Chile was for the most part based on the use of a yearly global quota (TAC), effort restrictions (licenses) and seasonal closure of fisheries justified on biological considerations. However, in 1991, during the debates surrounding the writing of a new fisheries law, there was much discussion of introducing an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system to avoid the emerging problems of 'racing', over investment, effort distortions, and declining length of fishing seasons.
At the time it became political impossible to introduce ITQ's due to the opposition of an important industrial group that was changing the focus of its activities from the north of the country to the south.
2 During the 1980's the most important fishery was the northern pelagic fishery (see Figure   1 ), based on the Anchovy (Engraulis ringens) and Spanish Sardine (Sardinops sagax), used in the production of fishmeal. Industrial catches of Spanish Sardine peaked in 1985 with 2.6 million tons (Barria y Serra, 1989) . However, by the end of the eighties it was clear that this fishery was collapsing (landings reached 1.4 million tons by 1989 and have only averaged 123 thousand tons during the last ten years; Sernapesca, 2003) . The center of gravity of the industry was now turning towards the southern pelagic fishery based on Jack Maquerel (Trachurus murphyi). The strategy of the industrial group owning the fleet and processing plants in the north was to migrate south and enter the emerging southern pelagic fishery. An ITQ system would have made this migration much more costly, if not impossible, since its introduction would have required some type of granfathering in the allocation of initial quotas which would have forced newcomers without history in the fishery to pay to enter this fishery. Therefore, the industrial group of the north lobbied hard against an ITQ system, and won.
Figure 1: Chilean Pelagic Fisheries (A): Northern Fishery (B): Southern Fishery
During the nineties the southern pelagic fishery flourished. Although the number of licenses and storage capacity in this fishery was formally fixed in 1991, fishing boats and capacity kept increasing through a series of loopholes in the regulations. 3 Potential fishing effort, measured by storage capacity of the fleet, grew 134% between 1989 and 1995. Landings steadily increased during this period, reaching a peak of 4 million tons in 1995.
By the late nineties, it was evident that the southern fishery was in problems. The decline of stocks due to over fishing, together with a strong 'El Niño' phenomenon in 1997 -1998 , reduced the adult biomass considerably, and landings began to show an above average presence of juveniles. Storage capacity had kept increasing making over investment in the fishery acute.
As a reaction to the increasing presence of juveniles in catches, the authorities closed the fishery starting in December 1997. However, the social and political impacts of a complete closure would have been enormous. Instead, the authorities devised a mechanism so that the fleet could continue to operate but in a controlled and orderly fashion that would not jeopardize the sustainability of the fishery. To this end, a series of 'research' or 'experimental' fishing expeditions were organized in the following three years. Participant boats had to sweep a pre-determined stretch of sea and locate existing schools of fish. This information was used by the authorities to gauge with more precision the level of biomass and its distribution. Once this was over, participant boats had the right to capture a pre-allocated per vessel quota of fish.
These controlled fishing expeditions, besides reducing the effort exerted on the resource, operated in practice as a pseudo individual quota system that served to show companies the benefits of such a system. Compared to the previous 'Olympic race' for resources, the individual quotas assigned to participant ships during the 'experimental' fishing expeditions allowed fishermen to optimize the use of their fleet.
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By the year 2000 there was consensus among industry participants, and the authorities, that in order to lift the closure of the fishery, an individual quota system would have to be introduced. The stumbling block for such a reform was the difficulty in reaching an agreement on the initial allocation of quotas. 5 An agreement was reached in the end and individual quotas were introduced for the most important industrial fisheries in Chile. They became operational in February 2001 and were initially given for a 2-year duration period. In 2002, a further reform extended these rights for 10 more years and incorporated the northern pelagic fisheries as well.
The effects of this quota system were instantaneous. The reform explicitly facilitated the merger of fishing operations of fleets from different companies, a sort of 'operational transferability' of quotas. Very soon after the reform, the number of boats in operation was reduced drastically from 148 in 2000 to 65 in 2002. Also, only the largest (from 500 to 1900 cubic meters of storage capacity) and newest boasts were kept active. Therefore, the excess capacity of the fleet was soon corrected, generating direct economic benefits in the form of lower operating costs. Another benefit of the reform was that due to the elimination of 'racing for fish', fishermen can now concentrate on catching less per trip, improving the quality of fish landings. This enabled the industry to allocate a higher percentage of landings to the higher value-added human consumption segment of the market, rather than to fishmeal production. 4 However, fishermen did not have total freedom to decide their fishing effort's technological composition. During these years, the fishery regulator prioritized the allocation of fishing quotas to the relatively bigger industrial vessels which were previously operating in this fishery. 5 To be politically acceptable grand fathering of rights was inevitable. However, the strategy followed by the authorities was to extract some of the rents generated in the fishery through an increase in the annual licensing fee. For more details on this, see Peña-Torres (2002a,b) .
In this paper, we describe the ITQ system introduced in Chile and offer a preliminary estimate of its direct allocative efficiency benefits. To this end we use a bioeconomic model of the Southern Jack
Mackerel fishery to generate a more convincing counterfactual scenario to the reform.
Alternatively, we could have compared the fishery before and after the reform, but it is highly unlikely that the pre-reform situation would give a good indication of what would have happened without the reform. Over investment may have worsened, increasing the economic costs of the prereform regulations. Also, the size and stability of the stock may have been more vulnerable in a prereform situation. But most importantly, this fishery is subject to a number of other regulations such as vessel licensing and a TAC. The benefits of the reform depend on the type and level of these regulations adopted for the future. The correct way then to measure the benefits of the reform is to simulate the future evolution of the fishery under different scenarios and regulatory systems. Thus, in this paper we use a biological age-structured model for the Jack Mackerel (Trachurus murphyi) stock, an estimated stock-recruitment function for this resource, several functions determining fleet dynamics, and a catch function, to model the dynamics of the fishery.
The parameters of these equations were estimated econometrically using data from 1985 The results show that the direct allocative efficiency benefits of the reform are substantial.
Depending on the scenario, the net discounted benefits, using a 10% discount rate over the 2001-2020 period, are between US$123 and US$366 million. 6 These scenarios assume a TAC of 1.1 million tons for the industrial fleet for each year, close to the current level set by the authorities for the industrial fleet. The results are not very sensitive to the range of TACs assumed in the simulations. 6 In Chile, social value discounting currently uses a 10% annual rate. The resulting net present values imply yearly net benefit flows of US$14.5 and US$43 million, respectively. Given that along the years 2002-2003 the southern Jack Mackerel industrial fishery exported about US$230 million per year, the estimated net annual benefits of the ITQ reform correspond to about 6.3% -18.7% of the annually exported value by this fishery.
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The paper is organized as follows. First we present a detailed description of the southern pelagic fishery in Chile. We then present a detailed description of the ITQ system introduced in 2001 and expanded in 2002. Following this we specify the bioeconomic model of the fishery and present the estimation results for each equation. The Monte Carlo results and the estimated benefits of the reform are then presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy lessons derived from the Chilean experience and possible directions for future research in this fishery.
The Southern Pelagic Fishery
This fishery runs along the V th to X th Regions, from latitude 33ºS to 41ºS, although its main center of operation is in front of the Talcahuano area in the VIIIº region of the country (L36ºS; see Figure   2 ), the zone where industrial fishing was first initiated around the mid 1940s. Industrial fishing has been historically concentrated on pelagic species used primarily for the production of fishmeal.
Although in the early stages of this fishery the main targeted species were the Anchovy (Engraulis In the beginning of the eighties this fishery was in a strong development phase both in terms of fishing capacity and processing capacity (see Table 1 ). From 1980 to 1985 the number of industrial vessels more than doubled, while the storage capacity of the fleet more than quadrupled. In the following decade the storage capacity of the fleet again increased by a factor of four. This coincided with the introduction of larger vessels (with greater capacity of displacement) in the industrial fleet.
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In terms of the resulting fishing effort, there was an increase of 6.7 times between 1985 and 1995. 9 7 This percentage is even higher, 88%, if the average is taken between 1985 and 1997 before the Jack Mackerel fishery was closed. 8 The first ships over 790 m 3 of storage capacity initiated operations in this fishery during 1989. In 1995 the number of ships with a storage capacity greater than 790 m 3 represented 34% of the industrial fleet. 9 The fishing effort index was constructed using the annual haul of the industrial fleet. That is, the sum over the whole fleet of the storage capacity of each individual ship (in m 3 ) multiplied by the days of fishing operations during each year. Landings of the three main species (Common Sardine, Anchovy and Jack Mackerel). (6) and (7): Average annual biomass (recruits plus higher aged cohorts), (6) for the fishing grounds between the V th and X th regions and (7) at the national level. Sources (1)- (7): National Fisheries Research Institute (IFOP).
Total industrial pelagic landings grew uninterrupted until they reached a peak of 3.5 -4 million tons in 1994 and 1995. 10 From then on catches began to fall, partially coinciding with a very intense 'El Niño' phenomenon beginning in 1997 and lasting until the middle of 1998.
11 If we consider the three main species caught, the level of catches in 2002 were less than half the 1994-95 peak; in the case of the Jack Mackerel the drop was even greater.
The dynamics just described for the annual catch was preceded by a similar evolution in the available biomass of the three main species. Columns 6 and 7 of During this period, the only possibility of capturing Jack Mackerel was to participate in one of the 'research' fishing expeditions organized by the authorities. Boats that qualified mainly those with more than 700 cubic meters of storage capacity had to sign a formal agreement with the authorities. Those that would eventually participate were chosen at random from the list of qualified boats before each expedition.
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The research fishing expeditions consisted first of a search stage where boats had to follow a preassigned path from the coast outwards in a zig-zag pattern whose length varied from 400 to 500 nautical miles. Each ship had its own course to follow, which differed by 1º latitude from the other courses. Figure 2 presents an example of the design of an expedition, where the green lines represent the charted course for each ship. In this stage, ships had to detect schools of Jack Mackerel, catch some fish and measure some environmental variables in order for the authorities to better gauge the size and distribution of the resource. Once this stage was completed, ships were allowed to fish a pre-assigned quota but only within some areas (square areas of between 50 and 100 nautical miles) of their charted course (red squares in Figure 2 ). Lat 40º S 700 cubic meters of storage capacity). Second, boats could still be used in the anchovy and sardine fishery, especially the smaller ones. Third, there was uncertainty as to the future regulation of the fishery. In this context, maintaining the whole fleet licensed and operational had an option value for companies due to the possibility that the fishery would be reopened in the future.
The ITQ system implemented in 2001
The individual quota system introduced in 15 The annual TAC for each resource is first divided into a TAC for the industrial sector and a TAC for the artisanal sector. Industrial ships are prohibited from operating within the first 5 nautical miles off the coast where the artisanal fleet operates. 16 The storage capacity of each ship was first adjusted to take account of the fact that some ships were only authorized to fish in a sub-region of the fishery. In the Appendix we present the allocation rule used for each fishery in the country. Here it suffices to mention that the first allocation rule was used for the three species relevant for the southern pelagic fishery.
Quotas were initially set for two years. The system began operating in February 2001, but in December 2002 a new law was passed extending the quotas for a ten year period (until 2012) and incorporating the northern pelagic fisheries as well. The extension of quotas for ten years was justified by the argument that companies needed a longer horizon of secure 'property rights' over quotas in order to undertake investments. 17 Naturally, the grandfathering nature of the initial allocation rule and the extension of quotas for a ten-year period meant that established fishermen would receive all of the resource rents of the fisheries. The authorities knew that any proposal to tender all or some of the quotas would derail the 17 A more detailed discussion about how Chilean fisheries law deals with the concept of 'property rights' over fishing quotas can be found at Peña-Torres (2002a and b).
reform.
18 However, they did manage to increase the licensing fee in the fishery in order to extract some of these rents.
19
There are two ways in which quotas are transferable. First, the new law gives ample flexibility for companies to merge their fishing operations during a particular year. Thus, private agreements can be made to share or 'rent' the quotas for a period of time. Companies are not obliged to use all of their authorized ships, and ships not used during a particular year were initially exempted from the annual payment of the licensing fee. 20 Second, a ship can be irrevocably retired from the fishery.
The authorities will then give the owner a document with the history of landings and storage capacity of that ship used to allocate the initial quota. This document, stipulating the individual quota associated with that ship, can be transferred to other ships of the company's fleet or can be sold.
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Landings are monitored and audited by authorized private companies. Fishing companies must pay for this service and must have a landing report after each fishing trip. A company that does not inform its landings -or is caught discarding fish-losses 30% of its quota for that year. 22 If it informs its landings but does not obtain a certificate from an authorized auditor, it losses 10% of its yearly quota. If a company lands in excess of its quota in a given year it losses three times that amount in the following year's quota.
Modeling the Jack Mackerel Fishery
In order to obtain an estimate of direct allocative efficiency benefits of the reform, a bioeconomic model of the southern pelagic fishery is used. This model is composed of several equations that describe the evolution of key variables in the fishery, including an age structured biomass model, yearly recruitment of each species, the evolution of the fleet's size (number of operating vessels) and composition (vessel types), fishing effort and yearly landings. The parameters of each equation
were estimated using data for the fishery from 1985 through 2002, except for the biological equations where data was available from 1975 for the case of Jack Mackerel.
Originally, recruitment equations and an age structured model were also specified and estimated for Anchovy and Sardine. However, in the model we present below we do not simulate the evolution of these two species for two reasons. First, the biological data available for them begins only in 1991, thus much fewer data points were available to estimate reliable stock recruitment functions. Second and more important, the southern pelagic industrial fleet modelled in this study accounts only for a minor proportion of the overall landing of these two species, thus a model that only includes the A Ricker stock recruitment function was specified and estimated for the Jack Mackerel. 23 The general form of the Ricker function is:
where R t is the number of recruits in year t, S t-γ is the biomass (in tons) of spawning adults in the population in the year t-γ, where γ is the age of recruits (γ =2 years in the case of Jack Mackerel).
The estimated parameters are presented in Table 2 . 22 If it does not have sufficient quota left that year, next year's quota is reduced. 23 The Ricker model is normally used for species with highly fluctuating recruitment, involving high fecundity as well as high natural mortality rates. Under favourable environmental conditions, species of this type can rapidly increase the range of their geographical distribution (for more details, see Yepes 2004 , Begon and Mortimer 1986 , and Haddon 2001 Note: all estimated coefficients were highly significant statistically.
The biomass evolves according to the following age structured model:
where B ct is the biomass of cohort c in year t, N ct is the number of individuals of cohort c in year t, W ct is the average weight of an individual of cohort c in year t, M c is the natural mortality of cohort c (assumed constant through time) and F ct-1 is the fishing mortality of cohort c in year t-1. This age structured model is quite standard and has been used recently in the bioeconomic modeling of other pelagic fisheries. 24 The natural mortality rate for Jack Mackerel has been estimated by IFOP to be 0.23 (and assumed to be the same across different age cohorts)
The landings, effort and fleet data comes from the IFOP database which registers the technical characteristics, landings, days at sea and other variables for each individual industrial vessel operating in this fishery. This information was obtained on a yearly basis from 1985 to 2002. Ships were first classified into one of nine size categories, and a pseudo panel for each size category and year was constructed taking the average of each variable within each category and year. The justification for using these pseudo panels instead of the individual ship data was to average out measurement error in the individual data. Also, specifying and estimating a model based on individual ship information would have been very cumbersome for forecasting purposes.
A Catch equation was estimated using the pseudo panel data. Although previous research on this fishery has rejected a Cobb-Douglas specification for the catch equation in favor of a translog specification (Peña-Torres, Basch and Vergara, 2003; Peña-Torres, Vergara and Basch, 2004) , in this paper we use the former functional form for simplicity. In addition, having quadratic terms in the catch equation, as in a translog specification, may generate forecasting problems since variables may become negative or grow to unrealistic levels much faster than in a linear model.
The estimated catch equation is presented in Table 3 , where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the annual catch (measured in tons) per vessel category. The equation was first estimated using
Generalized Least Squares to take into account the heteroskedasticity implicit in each observation of the pseudo panel (since the number of individual ships in each size category and year was different).
In spite of this estimation strategy, the econometric tests rejected the null hypothesis of no additional heteroskedasticity. Therefore, our preferred results were estimated using Feasible GLS. The biomass (calculated at the beginning of each year) is also statistically significant but its impact on catches diminishes as ship size increases. This is consistent with the fact that, especially for larger vessels, the use of electronic search equipments and the longer autonomy at sea, together with the schooling behavior of pelagic fish species, could imply that biomass abundance may not significantly affect catches but only until the biomass is close to collapsing (Clark, 1971 and 1985) .
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Finally, the effect of introducing the experimental fishing expeditions during the 1997-2000 period served, ceteris paribus, to reduce annual catches of Jack Mackerel per vessel. This result is probably dominated by the fact that in these expeditions ships had to undertake a number of days at sea in search of schools, in a pre-allocated path, without being able to fish.
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Due to the estimation method used, no R 2 is reported for the Jack Mackerel catch equation.
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However, as an indication of the fit of the model, the R 2 of estimating this model by GLS was 0.94.
The estimated residuals were used to estimate the variance of the distribution of errors. In the southern industrial pelagic fishery, there are a few companies that own most of the fleet.
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Therefore, each company has to decide upon the optimal use of its own fleet. Lets assume initially that each company hast one of each of two types of ships, that differ in terms of the marginal cost of effort and its catch per effort relationship (catch equation). Lets assume to start with that an ITQ system is in place. In this situation each company maximizes profits subject to the constraint that total landings are equal to the assigned quota: 
where the Lagrange multiplier is no longer present. In principle, we could estimate equation (1) and (2) separately using information for each period according to the regulation applied. However, since the Lagrange multiplier enters equations (1) in a non-linear form, thus requiring data intensive nonlinear techniques to estimate, and we only have two years of data for the period under ITQ, the estimated results will not be very reliable. Instead we estimate a single equation using a dummy variable for the year 2001 and another dummy variable for 2002 as a proxy for the change that the introduction of the ITQ system had on the determination of effort. 30 We also used another dummy variable for the period 1997-2000 to identify a change in the effort equation due to the closure of the fishery and the introduction of the experimental fishing expeditions.
Effort is measured as days fishing each year, which is truncated at 0 and 365. Therefore, we apply a logistic transformation to the effort variable in order to makes its range equal to the real numbers.
This transformation is given by:
29 The price is taken to be the average international price for a ton of fishmeal. The parameter used to relate catches to fishmeal production is 0.22. That is, a ton of catch will produce on average 0.22 tons of fishmeal. 30 The reason why we used two dummy variables for 2001 and 2002 instead of one variable for both yearsas in the catch equation is that in the year 2001 the ITQ were introduced in February and the effort data for that year is contaminated by open access fishing during January. Second, any misspecification in any of the two equations would bias the other equations. Thus, a less efficient, but still consistent, single equation estimation strategy was followed. The results are presented in Table 4 .
As in the catch equation the effort equation was first estimated using Generalized Least Squares to take into account the heteroskedasticity implicit in each observation of the pseudo panel (since the number of individual ships in each size category and year was different). In spite of this estimation strategy, the econometric tests rejected the null hypothesis of no additional heteroskedasticity.
Therefore, our preferred results were estimated using Feasible GLS.
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31 The closure of the fishery and the introduction of experimental fishing expeditions was in November 1997. Thus for that year this reform was applied only 2 months and thus the dichotomous dummy variable takes this value for that year. 32 The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation could not be rejected. The investment dynamics can be heuristically modelled as a two-stage process. First, the profitability of fishing activities affects the decision of whether to retire or introduce a ship into the fishery. Second, if a decision has been made to introduce a new ship, its optimal size category must be determined. The economic returns to fishing are inherently uncertain, especially in this pelagic fishery geared towards the production of fishmeal. Being a traded commodity its price is determined on the world market and can be quite volatile depending on global economic activity. On the other hand, the environmental uncertainties related to fish stock abundance, migration and other effects makes catching fish an uncertain activity in itself. Additionally, fleet investment usually implies a high degree of value specificity and therefore ex-post sunk costs.
Modern investment theory predicts that the decision to undertake or abandon a value-specific investment project under uncertainty will depend on certain variables reaching a threshold level.
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In particular, if we define E(V/t) as the expected net present value of an investment project estimated using all the information available until t, then theory predicts that the project will be undertaken when:
for some positive parameter . Notice that under uncertainty an investor in a value-specific project will decide to undertake an investment when the net present value of this investment is strictly above zero by a certain amount. The reason for this is that there is an option value of postponing an investment decision until more information is available. Thus only when the net present value of undertaking the project now is above this option value will the decision be made to go ahead with the project. The analogous condition for abandoning a project is:
Under uncertainty an investor will not abandon a project when the net present value reaches zero, only when this value is sufficiently below zero. When the expected value of the project is between and , the optimal decision is not to invest, if the project has not yet begun, and to continue operating, if the project is already in operation.
The particular values of and will depend on various factors, including the properties of the stochastic process followed by the underlying random variables that affect the value of the project (in particular the variance of the distributions), the amount of the required initial investment and 35 The cost of effort only includes the variable fuel, labor and material costs of fishing trips.
possible exit costs. These last costs include payments required if operation ceases (severance payments for example) as well as any sunk cost of the project.
As shown by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , the higher is the amount of the initial investment, the higher the values of and . Thus, from the point of view of the current model, these parameters should be allowed to differ for different ship size categories.
Assume that investors observe the results of each ship in year t. They can then form an idea of the relative profitability of each type of vessel. Assume for the moment that firms can renew their fleet each year without any adjustment cost. Then, each firm will decide to have a fleet composed of ships type i, where:
where j indexes all types of ships. In other words, they will choose the most profitable size category among those available. The econometrician does not directly observe E(V j /t) -j but he does observe a proxy for this value in the form of the current profitability of each type of ship:
where jt is the profitability of ship type j in year t and jt is an error assumed to be independently distributed among size categories and year. Besides measurement error, this error term can also be attributed to the possible dispersion of information as regards the relative profitability of each type of ship among firms. 37 Therefore, the probability that ship type i is the preferred type in year t is given by: 36 For a modern exposition of the theory see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . 37 In order for current profitability to proxy for the value of the project, the underlying stochastic variables must have the Markov property. That is, the expected value of each variable for the next period must be a function of the value of that variable in the current period only, not past values of these variables. In general, the stochastic processes of commodity prices (such as fishmeal) have this property.
If it is further assumed that the jt have an extreme value distribution, then the probability of that ship type i is the preferred type in year t has a multinomial logistic distribution Since each variable is defined relative to the base category, which we defined as the category of ships between 510 and 650 m3 of storage capacity, the observations for the base category are not used in the estimation.
The profitability of each type of ship was empirically defined as:
where p t fm is the price of fishmeal in year t, c t fm is the cost of processing fishmeal in year t, L it is total landings (including species other than Jack Mackerel) by the average ship of category i in year t, is a technical parameter to convert tons of fish into fishmeal, c it E is the cost per unit of effort, E it is the effort level (days fishing per year) by the average ship of category i in year t, c it FC is the fixed cost related to ships of type i in year t (including routine maintenance costs) and I i is the investment cost of a ship type i. The estimation results for our preferred model are presented in Table 5 . Intermediate results showed that a category specific intercept was rejected in favor of a common intercept, which in any case is not statistically significant. This implies that the parameter is very similar across ship categories.
In addition, using the relative profitability of two years ago gave a better fit than using the relative profitability lagged one year. This may be due to a longer than expected lag between the decision to invest and the time new ships become operational. The parameter on the lagged relative frequencies implies a relatively low of about 0,2. 38 Thus, adjustment to the preferred fleet configuration is quite slow. Finally, a dummy taking a value of 1 in the years 2001 and 2002 was included. 39 The value of the estimated coefficient associated with this variable implies that the introduction of ITQs changed increased the relative attractiveness of ships of categories different from the base category. 
Note:
*** indicates the parameter is significant at 1% level; ** indicates the parameter is significant at 5% level; * indicates the parameter is significant at 10% level.
The final equation of the model is the one determining the Number of ships in the fishery. As in the previous equation, a standard partial adjustment model was specified for the total number of vessels active in the fishery. In addition, the average profitability among the fleet lagged two periods was included as an explanatory variable plus a dummy variable for the 2001 and 2002 period. 40 The results are shown on Table 6 . period served to lower the number of ships active in the fishery. This is to be expected since firms 38 is equal to (1-2 ). 39 A dummy variable for the 1997-2000 period was also tested but it was not statistically significant. 40 Once again a dummy for the 1997-2000 period was not significant, implying that the introduction of ITQs in 2001 had a significant impact on investment behavior while the closure and subsequent experimental fishing experience did not affect investment behavior compared to the previous regime.
under an ITQ system have no incentives for 'racing for fish' and instead can optimize the planning and timing of their operations. Related to this, prior to the ITQ system firms had an incentive to maintain licensed ships active (even operating them just for few days a year 41 ) in case the fishery was later reopened. 
A complete summary of our model of the southern pelagic Jack Mackerel fishery is presented in Table 7 . The exogenous variables of the model are the price of fishmeal, all the cost and investment figures, the fish to fishmeal conversion parameter , the landings of other species (OH), the nonmodelled landings of Jack Mackerel (NIH) 42 , the natural mortality parameter M, and the cohort catchability parameters . The endogenous variables include the recruitment of Jack Mackerel, its harvest and its biomass, as well as fleet's effort, size and composition.
In order to evaluate the performance of the model, the fitted values were compared to the real values of the endogenous variables during the 1987 to 2002 period. 43 The results are presented in compared to what happened in reality. However, for such complex phenomena the model is quite satisfactory. 25.000.000 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1
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The allocative efficiency benefits of the ITQ system are measured as the difference in the net present value of producer's surplus from simulations where this system is imposed compared to the a counterfactual regime without ITQs. The price of fishmeal is assumed to be exogenous to this fishery and determined in the international market. Therefore, consumer surplus is not affected by the events in this fishery and is not relevant for the evaluation of the introduction of the ITQ system.
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rental value of the fleet. More formally, the Producer Surplus for the average ship type i in year t is given by:
where r is the discount rate, and N is the useful life of the vessel. The last expression converts the investment cost of ship type i into an annuity. This way of treating investment costs is correct only if there is no sunk cost associated with the current fleet operating in the fishery. In other words, it assumes there is a perfect secondary or rental market for these vessels. Although this may not seem very realistic, it was the only reasonable assumption to make. Otherwise, the optimal replacement of existing vessels would have had to be modelled, something that goes beyond the reaches of the present study (we do not have information on currently operating vessels' age). In case that some sunk cost is associated with the operating fleet, our calculations of the yearly producer surplus should then be understood as a conservative (lower bound) estimate.
Producer surplus was aggregated over all types of vessels for each year and then discounted at a 10% rate to compute the net present value of producer surplus for the fishery under each regulatory regime. The useful life of all vessels was assumed to be 15 years.
The definition of a counterfactual regulatory regime is not straightforward. In this study it is taken One final comment before presenting the results: It is possible that the stock collapses to zero in some scenario. In this case, Jack Mackerel catches are zero from then on, but the fleet remains active catching other resources. The fall in profitability that this implies will gradually reduce the size of the fleet. Table 9 presents the results for a TAC of 1.1 million tons for each year. Since the TAC is the same for each simulation, the catch and stock dynamics are identical with and without the ITQ system. Thus, their corresponding averages over the 100 simulations are also the same. From the results it can be seen that the biomass increases at the beginning of the projection period and later falls.
Results
The main difference between both scenarios is that under an ITQ system the number of ships in the fishery remains relatively constant, even decreasing slightly. On the other hand, without the ITQ system the number of ships increases dramatically. 46 This in turn implies that the net producer surplus from the fishery is about US$366 million higher under an ITQ system than without it. 45 In each simulation the model was resolved by finding the level of effort that made aggregate catches equal to the TAC. This had to be done numerically. 46 In practice, the initial unemployment triggered by the reduction in the number of operating ships (under the real ITQ system) has later been partially counteracted by increases in the number of regular jobs in the fish processing sector, the latter being the result of ITQ-triggered changes in the final productive mix towards higher value added processing activities (which are also more labor intensive than fishing effort activities). Unfortunately, we had no access to more detailed information about ITQ-triggered effects upon labor markets and final processing production. The evolution of the fleet size may not be very credible. Before the fleet reaches a size above the pre-2001 licensed ships it is probable that the authorities would try to avoid additional entry.
Therefore, we also ran the model with a limit of 132, the number of active vessels before the 2001 reform. The results are presented in Table 10 .
Clearly, a limit on the number of ships increases the economic benefits of the pre-reform scenario.
The net benefits of introducing the ITQ system falls to US$123 million, still a significant figure.
Finally, in Table 11 the results are presented for a scenario where the TAC is raised to 1.300.000
tons per year after 2002. During 2001 and 2002 the TAC is maintained at 1.100.000 tons since this is very close to the actual levels set for these years by the authorities. The limit on the total number of vessels in the fishery is also maintained as in the previous scenario. out to the need of optimizing the TAC level in order to maximize the economic benefits from the fishery. This is undertaken with this same model in an accompanying paper by the authors (Gómez-Lobo, Barría and Peña-Torres, 2005).
Conclusions
An The way the ITQ system was introduced in Chile is also of interest. From December 1997 to December 2000 the fishery was closed for biological reasons. However, the authorities organized 'Experimental' fishing expeditions in order to maintain the fleet active but under very controlled operational conditions. These expeditions worked informally as a pseudo individual quota system. This experience allowed fishermen to learn the benefits of such a system, which was instrumental in facilitating the formal introduction of an ITQ system later. Perhaps this 'didactic' approach used in
Chile may be replicated in other countries wishing to introduce an ITQ system.
